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Abstract
This paper examines the welfare-maximizing degree of patent protection in a growth model where
the engines of economic growth are R&D and public services. We find that an increase in public ser-
vices enhances the positive and negative effects of strengthening patent protection on R&D and the
volume of production, respectively. However, if public services are relatively small, the negative wel-
fare effect associated with the decrease in production volume tends to outweigh the positive welfare
effect from the increase in the growth rate, and so the welfare-maximizing degree of patent protection
tends to be lower. This result provides one possible explanation for why developing countries tend
to prefer weaker patent protection.
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1 Introduction
Since the Agreement on TRIPs, patent protection has strengthened in both developing and developed
countries. According to Park (2008), however, in many developing countries, including African countries
and some Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand and Indonesia, the indices of patent protection
remain relatively low.1 The purpose of this paper is to examine why most developing countries do not
prefer stronger patent protection.
It is commonly thought that developing countries are unwilling to strengthen patent protection be-
cause it impedes the domestic use of technologies created by developed countries. To consider this effect
of patent protection, many early studies examine the effects of strengthening patent protection in North–
South two-country models where technologies typically transfer from developed to developing countries
(Gustafsson and Segerstrom 2011, Iwaisako et al. 2011, and Tanaka and Iwaisako 2012). On the other
hand, infrastructure services exert a strong impact on the productivity of private inputs and the rate of
return on capital, as discussed in Age´nor and Moreno-Dodson (2006), and these also have a significant
impact on the effects of strengthening patent protection. Thus, we anticipate that differences in infras-
tructure services can play an important role in explaining differences in the degree of patent protection.
Hence, this paper focuses on the role of public services supplied by governments as the main reason for
the differences in the strength of patent protection commonly found across countries.
By introducing productive public spending into a variety expansion-type R&D-based growth model
following Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991), we construct a model where both R&D and public services
are the engines of economic growth. By examining the welfare-maximizing degree of patent protection,
we show that a country that can maintain only a lower level of public services prefers weaker patent
protection as long as the ratio of public services to output is not too high.2 This result then explains why
developing countries prefer the weaker protection of patents. In addition, this result is also consistent
with the empirical evidence; we identify a positive correlation between the ratio of government spending
to GDP and an index of patent protection as also shown in Figure 1.3
1The values of the patent protection indices in Thailand and Indonesia were 2.66 and 2.77 in 2005, while in most OECD
countries these same values exceed 4.
2 In fact, we find a small but positive correlation between per capita GDP and the ratio of government spending to GDP, as
also shown in Appendix A.
3 The data source for the ratio of government spending to GDP is the United Nations’ National Accounts Main Aggregates
Database, while the data source for the index of patent protection is Park (2008). The latest data for the index of patent
protection are for 2005 and thus we use the 2005 data. We obtain data for both variables for 118 countries. The scatterplot in
Figure 1 depicts the relation between the ratio of government spending to GDP and index of patent protection for 118 countries
in 2005, for which we can easily discern a positive correlation.
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Figure 1: Ratio of government spending to GDP and patent protection
There are some important studies relating to the present analysis. Grossman and Lai (2004), for
example, derived the Nash equilibrium patent length in a two-country game and showed that the country
with more abundant human capital chooses a longer patent length. However, unlike the present work,
this was not a growth model. Chu and Lai (2012) also examined the effects of productive public services
in an R&D-based growth model. However, they focused on the effects of defense R&D as a public
service on growth and welfare and derived only the welfare-maximizing level of defense R&D. Finally,
Chu, Cozzi, and Gali (2011) examined optimal patent protection in developing countries and showed
that the optimal degree of patent protection increases as an economy endogenously develops toward the
global technology frontier. In contrast with the present study, which examines how the optimal patent
protection depends on the public services a country can provide, their study examined how the optimal
patent protection depends on the stage of development. Thus, their study and the present analysis are
complementary.
3
2 Model
Following Barro (1990), we assume that governments can increase the productivity of private firms by
providing public services. The final good is produced using labor and intermediate goods as follows:
 
 
  
 
 
 

 


 

 


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denotes the volume of labor devoted to final
good production, 
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is productive public spending, and 
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is the volume of intermediate good  devoted
to final good production. The market for the final good is assumed to be perfectly competitive and we
take the final good as numeraire. Letting 
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denote the price of intermediate good , we obtain the
conditions for profit maximization as follows:
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One unit of labor produces one unit of each intermediate good and a single firm holding the patent
monopolistically supplies each intermediate good. Now we must consider how governments protect
patents. Generally, governments control the degree of patent protection through patent length and
breadth. However, for simplicity, we assume that the patent length is fixed and infinite and that gov-
ernments control the degree of patent protection using only patent breadth.4 Following Goh and Olivier
(2002), Iwaisako and Futagami (2012), and Chu et al. (2012), we assume that the broader the govern-
ment makes patent breadth, the more difficult it is to produce imitative goods. We specify the unit cost
of producing imitative goods as 
 
   	, where strengthening patent protection increases the
value of . Each firm that produces an intermediate good charges a price such that producers of imitative
goods cannot earn positive profits, as follows: 

 
  
 
 Because prices are symmetric across interme-
diate goods, the volumes of production are also symmetric. Letting 
 
denote the volume of production,
from the demand for each intermediate good (2), 
 
satisfies

 
  	
 
 

 


 
 
 (3)
The intermediate goods firms are symmetric, and thus the profits are symmetric. Letting  denote the
profit, we obtain       
 

 

We turn now to R&D activities. Devoting  units of the final good in the time interval , R&D firms
can invent  units of intermediate goods. Letting 
 
denote the patent value of one intermediate good
4A number of studies have specified the probability of imitation as a parameter in the enforcement of patents and have
examined the effects of strengthening patent protection; these include Eicher and Garcı´a–Pen˜alosa (2008), Furukawa (2007),
Horii and Iwaisako (2007), and Gangopadhyay and Mondal (2012).
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and the stock value of a firm producing one intermediate good, we obtain the R&D equilibrium condition
as follows: 
 
   Next, we consider the equilibrium condition of the stock value of a firm (the price
of the patent). Here we assume that the profit of firms is taxed at rate  . As discussed below, the tax
revenue is spent on public services. If households possess one unit of stock in the time interval , they
can obtain a profit of   
 
 and a capital gain or a loss of 
 
. Alternatively, they can invest 
 
units
of funds in a risk-free asset, and obtain 
 

 
, where 
 
is the interest rate of the risk-free asset. Therefore,
in equilibrium, the no-arbitrage condition must hold as follows: 
 

 
    
 



 

The economy consists of a unit continuum of identical households, each of which consists of 
consumers. Each consumer inelastically supplies one unit of labor at each time point. The lifetime utility
of the household is given by   
 



 
	
 
 
 where 
 
is per capita consumption and  is the
subjective discount rate. We assume that both labor income and corporate income are taxed at the rate  .
The intertemporal budget constraint is given by
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 where 
 
is the interest rate, 

is the initial per capita asset holdings, and 
 
denotes the wage.
The necessary condition for the maximization of the household’s utility is given by the following Euler
equation: 	 
	
 
  
 
  
We assume that the government provides public services, 
 
, to keep the ratio of public services to
output constant at  (that is, 
 
   
 
) and that the budget for the government balances at each point
of time. As discussed, the government collects tax revenues by imposing taxes on labor and corporate
income at the constant rate of  ; that is, the tax revenue is 
 
  
 

 
    
 
. Thus, the tax rate
equals the public services–output ratio; that is,    .
3 The market equilibrium path
In this section, we derive the market equilibrium path in this economy.
To start with, we derive the equilibrium allocation of labor. From (1) and (3), we obtain 
 
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Combining this and the labor market equilibrium condition,    
 

 

 
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 The production function of the final good can be rewritten as
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, and the efficient ratio is given by  
 

 
 

 
, and thus,     obtains the
efficient allocation of labor. Furthermore, we can see that the volume of production decreases as 
increases. Substituting these and 
 
   
 
into the production function, we obtain output as follows:
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 (4)
This shows that the reduced-form production function is of an  structure, and thus, the ratio of
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consumption to the number of invented goods is constant on the equilibrium path in the present model.
Here, we let 
 
denote the ratio; that is, 
 
 
 

 
. Consequently, the growth rate  and the ratio of
aggregate consumption to the number of invented goods  are given by5
     
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 (6)
Before conducting the welfare analysis, we examine how strengthening patent protection affects
economic growth and the consumption level. First, we can show that strengthening patent protection
enhances economic growth, as follows:
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Strengthening patent protection lowers average productivity  
 

 
  

 
. However, the positive
effect obtained through increasing profit overwhelms this negative effect.6 We also show that strength-
ening patent protection reduces the ratio of consumption to the number of invented goods, as follows:
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where we use the fact that   . Strengthening patent protection lowers average productivity by
bringing about a distortion in labor allocation. This enhances R&D investment and therefore necessarily
reduces consumption. Next, we examine how increasing public services affects the growth-enhancing
effect of patent protection, 

, and the consumption-reducing effect, 

. An increase in the public
services–output ratio, , has two opposing effects, as shown in Barro (1990). That is, while it increases
productivity and output, it also raises the tax rate, weakens the incentive for R&D, and thereby reduces
after-tax income. Therefore, both the growth rate and the ratio of consumption to the number of invented
goods display an inverted-U shape with respect to , as we can see from (5) and (6). Put strictly, if
the public services–output ratio is so low that   	, an increase in the public services–output ratio
increases both the growth rate and the ratio of consumption to the number of invented goods; otherwise,
an increase in  reduces both.
Furthermore, inspecting (7) and (8), we can easily see that if the public services–output ratio is
lower (higher) than 	, increasing the public services–output ratio enhances (weakens) both the growth-
enhancing effect and the consumption-reducing effect proportionally.
5See Appendix B for a detailed derivation.
6See Appendix C for the proof and property of   .
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4 Welfare-maximizing patent policy
We can easily calculate the lifetime utility as a function of patent breadth, . From the fact that 
 
 

 
   


 
, we can obtain the lifetime utility:     
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
	





	



, and thus the
welfare-maximizing condition of  satisfies7 8


   




 (9)
As shown in Appendix D, we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 1 If the public services–output ratio is low (high) such that   	 ( " 	), an increase in
the public services–output ratio raises (reduces) the welfare-maximizing degree of patent protection.
We can understand the reason for this result by using the welfare-maximizing condition (9), as follows.
We focus on the case where   	: that is, an increase in  raises both the growth rate and the ratio of
consumption to the number of invented goods.9 The increase in  strengthens both the growth-enhancing
effect and the consumption-reducing effect of strengthening patent protection. However, these positive
and negative effects are proportional, as discussed in the previous section, and therefore, the ratio of
the two effects 




does not depend on . Consequently, the increase in  has no impact on the
RHS of (9). On the other hand, as shown in 

 
 


 




 




, the marginal utility of the level of
consumption is diminishing while the marginal utility of the growth rate is constant. The increase in 
thus reduces the marginal utility of ,  

and weakens the consumption-reducing effect. As a result, an
increase in  raises the welfare-maximizing degree of patent protection.
From the proposition, a country with a high level of public services prefers stronger patent protection
unless the public services–output ratio is so high that  " 	. Conversely, a poor country that cannot
maintain a high level of public services prefers weaker patent protection. This result may then explain
why patent protection in many developing countries is relatively weak. On the other hand, and as shown
in Park (2008), some rapidly growing countries, such as China and Vietnam, have strengthened patent
protection since 1990. Using the results from the present model, we can explain this tendency as follows.
Because of economic development, these countries have become able to maintain a high level of public
7 The economy jumps to the balanced growth path at time 0 so that 

is exogenously given at time 0.
8 We can prove that the welfare function is concave in patent breadth as shown in Appendix E.
9 Using 2010 data (the most recent available in the United Nations’ National Accounts Main Aggregates Database), we find
that the ratio of government spending is less than 0.3 in most countries. We also confirm this tendency in 2005, as shown in
Figure 1. In the present model, we consider  as the capital share, and thus    is the empirically relevant case.
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services, and thus their welfare-maximizing patent protection has increased in strength.10 Moreover,
the TRIPs agreement provides developing countries with an extension of time for strengthening patent
protection, for which the result in this paper provides something of a rationale.
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Appendix A: Data on ratio of government spending to GDP and per capita
GDP
In this appendix, in order to observe the actual relation between per capita GDP and the ratio of govern-
ment spending to GDP, we provide data for these variables in Figure 2. We use the 2010 data because they
are the most recent data available in the United Nations’ National Accounts Main Aggregates Database.
We identify a small but positive correlation between these variables.
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Figure 2: Per capita GDP and ratio of government spending to GDP
Appendix B: Growth rate and ratio of consumption to the number of in-
vented goods
In this appendix, we derive the equilibrium growth rate and the equilibrium ratio of consumption to the
number of invented goods.
Substituting the R&D equilibrium condition, 
 
  , into the no-arbitrage condition, 
 
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 we obtain the interest rate, as follows: 
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This unique steady state is unstable, and we can show that any path diverging to infinity violates the
Euler equation and any path converging to  violates the transversality condition. Therefore, the unique
solution of 
 
is given by 
 
  .
Appendix C: Proof of       and  
 
 
In this appendix, we show that    and that 

" .
First,  can be calculated as follows:
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Substituting this into (7) and rewriting this yields
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where we use   	.
Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 1
In this appendix, we prove Proposition 1.
In the remainder of the analysis, and to focus on the case where the growth rate is positive, we limit
the analysis to the range , 

 	, where 
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 


	


 




  .
First, we calculate the right-hand side (RHS) of (9),  
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. Substituting (7) and (8) into this, we
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Figure 3: Determination of the welfare-maximizing patent breadth
Furthermore, substituting  into this and rewriting it yields
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Therefore, the RHS of (9) is a decreasing function of .
 is a decreasing function of  and the left-hand side (LHS) of (9) is an increasing function of .
Therefore, (9) determines the welfare-maximizing patent breadth uniquely, as depicted in Figure 3.
Using Figure 3, we now examine how an increase in the public services–output ratio affects the
welfare-maximizing patent breadth. First, an increase in  has no impact on the ratio of the growth-
enhancing effect to the consumption-reducing effect,  




, and thus the curve remains unchanged.
Second, we consider the impact of  on . As mentioned, an increase in the public services–output
ratio affects the ratio of consumption to the number of invented goods in opposite ways. If   	
3
( " 	), the increase in  increases (decreases)  and thus shifts the curve  downward (upward).
This raises (lowers) the welfare-maximizing patent breadth, as depicted in Figure 3. Thus, we can prove
Proposition 1.
Appendix E: The proof of concavity of the welfare function
In this appendix, to ensure that the second-order condition is satisfied, we prove that the welfare function
 is concave in patent breadth.
The second derivative of  is given by
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First, from (7) and (8), we obtain the second derivatives of  and  as follows:
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Using (6), (12) and (13), we get
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Therefore, if
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we can show that the second derivative of  is negative.
As mentioned in Appendix D, we assume that  satisfies   

	


 

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  in order to focus
on the case where the growth rate is positive. Thus,
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Here, we obtain the second derivative of , as follows:
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Substituting this into the LHS of the inequality, (14) can be rewritten as follows:
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Therefore, if
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is negative, we can show that   .
Using (10) and (15), we can rewrite (16) as follows:
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The range of  is given by 

 	. #       , # 	      	

    , and #  is a
convex quadratic function. 

"  and thus #    for   

 	.
Hence,     for   

 	 and thus we can show that the welfare function is concave
in patent breadth.
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